Seigniorage revenue and monetary policy: some preliminary evidence by Joseph H. Haslag
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Money creation is one potential source of
revenue for a government. Seigniorage—gov-
ernment revenue received through creating
money—is a relatively inexpensive means of
raising funds. Take the United States as an
example. It costs just a few pennies to print a
$100 bill. The resource costs to the U.S.
Treasury are more than offset by the value of
the goods that could be purchased with the
$100 bill. It is even less expensive for the
Federal Reserve to electronically purchase large
quantities of Treasury bonds, notes, and bills
from traders in New York. It is important to note
that the Federal Reserve returns the interest pay-
ments on its security holdings (less its expenses)
to the U.S. Treasury. Consequently, when the
Federal Reserve increases its bond holdings, for
example, the U.S. Treasury realizes an effective
reduction to its debt expenses.
1 The present
value of the reduction in Treasury expenses is
equal to the amount of money injected by the
Federal Reserve’s open market purchase.
The problem is that although money may
be cheap to produce, the social costs of money
creation are almost certainly greater than what
the Federal Reserve pays to create it. Indeed, a
large body of empirical evidence suggests that
the rate of money creation is closely correlated
with inflation. Thus, faster money creation costs
society by eroding the purchasing power of
money already in circulation, which is the infla-
tion tax. Though tempted by low production
costs, governments must balance the benefits
with social costs when deciding how much to
rely on seigniorage.
The article addresses two questions. First,
how much do countries rely on money creation
as a source of revenue? The answer to this ques-
tion gives some idea of the size of the seignior-
age revenue “problem.” For most of the
countries, money creation accounts for less than
2 percent of real GDP. The evidence indicates
that seigniorage revenue is not the primary
source of revenue for a government, but neither
is it quantitatively insignificant.
Second, are monetary policy settings sys-
tematically related to a government’s reliance
on real seigniorage revenue, and, if so, what is
the relationship? Such evidence should be a
useful guide for economic theories—that is, a
good theory should be able to account for a
government’s reliance on seigniorage revenue
versus, say, its reliance on income taxes.
Sargent (1986) presents some evidence
that very rapid money growth does not translate
into greater reliance on real seigniorage rev-
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hyperinflation episodes that occurred immedi-
ately following World War I. For two countries,
Austria and Hungary, Sargent reports data on
money growth and the fraction of government
spending earned through seigniorage revenue.
Austria raised about 67 percent of government
expenditures through money creation in the 
first half of 1919. However, the ratio of money
creation to government expenditures fell to
about 40 percent of government expenditures
by 1922. Between 1919 and 1922, Austrian
crowns in circulation went from roughly 4.7 
billion to nearly 4.1 trillion. For Hungary,
money creation accounted for more than 45
percent of its government expenditures in
1921–22, falling to about 33 percent in 1924–25.
Between February 1921 and April 1925,
Hungary saw its notes in circulation rise from 
15 billion kronen to 4.5 trillion kronen.
2 For
these two case studies, the evidence suggests
that reliance on money creation decreases as
the rate of money growth increases.
Hyperinflations are rare and probably not good
laboratories for studying the relationship be-
tween monetary policy and seigniorage reve-
nue. Still, the Austrian and Hungarian data show
that dramatic increases in the rate of money
growth do not necessarily translate into a 
government’s increased reliance on seigniorage 
revenue.
In this article, I use data from different
countries to identify whether a systematic rela-
tionship exists between monetary policy and a
country’s reliance on seigniorage revenue.
Rather than focus on year-to-year realizations,
the approach taken in this article is to study the
correlation between monetary policy and
seigniorage over a longer horizon; specifically,
the sample mean is computed from a 30-year
period. Both economic theory and problems
with statistical inference point to using a suffi-
cient statistic to measure monetary policy. (A
sufficient statistic captures changes in the vari-
able that the researcher is studying.) Here, the
monetary policy measure is a combination of
the money growth rate and the reserve ratio. As
such, the evidence bears on whether countries
with a high money growth rate–reserve ratio
combination also tend, on average, to rely more
heavily on seigniorage revenue over these
longer horizons than countries with a low
money growth rate–reserve ratio combination.
The cross-country evidence indicates a
positive association between the monetary 
policy measure and a country’s reliance on
seigniorage revenue. Thus, countries with high
monetary policy settings tend to rely more on
seigniorage revenue than countries with low
monetary policy settings. An additional implica-
tion follows from the way in which the measure
of monetary policy is constructed; specifically,
one can infer that the relationship between the
reserve ratio, which holds the money growth
rate constant, and a country’s reliance on sei-
gniorage revenue is concave. The concave rela-
tionship also holds between the money growth
rate and seigniorage reliance when the reserve
ratio is constant. The implied concavity com-
plements Sargent’s findings for Austria and
Hungary.
It is useful to begin with a brief overview
of seigniorage revenue that shows how it fits
into a broader picture of government finance.
SEIGNIORAGE REVENUE—AN OVERVIEW
Suppose the government prints new
pieces of currency and uses these newly created
bills to buy goods and services, such as missiles
or computers, or pay workers’ salaries.
3 For sim-
plicity, I assume that the economy has a com-
posite commodity (hereafter, the consumption
good). The government can buy units of this
consumption good with the newly printed
money, which is
(1) (Mt – Mt–1)vt ,
where  M denotes the total quantity of high-
powered money in the economy (t denotes
time), and v denotes the money’s value in terms
of the units of the consumption good that can
be acquired with one unit of money (that is, the
inverse of the price level). Thus, Equation 1 rep-
resents the units of the consumption good that
can be purchased with newly printed money—
in other words, real seigniorage revenue.
Seigniorage revenue is just one part of a
larger picture. To see the complete picture, it is
necessary to give the government’s income
statement, or budget constraint. To keep things
simple, assume that the government issues only
one-period, fully indexed bonds.
4 For this sim-
ple economy, the government’s budget con-
straint can be written as
(2) gt + rtbt –1 = ttyt + bt + (Mt – Mt –1)vt.
In Equation 2, g is the total quantity of goods
purchased by the government; the product, rb,
is the principal and interest payments, measured
in units of the good, that the government owes
for one-period bonds issued at date t –1 ;ris 
the real gross return (principal plus net interest)
on government securities worth b goods. Thus,
the left-hand side of Equation 2 represents 12
the total expenditures by the government. The
right-hand side characterizes the government’s
total receipts. The product, ty, represents the
income tax revenue earned by the government
at rate t, and y is the aggregate level of real
income.
Note that in Equation 2 the government
has access to an income tax. Representing tax
revenue this way is not necessary. However,
there is a useful analogy between seigniorage
revenue and income tax revenue. The relation-
ship between the income tax rate and tax reve-
nue has been popularized in the Laffer curve.
Suppose that income, y, is negatively related to
the tax rate. With an increase in the tax rate, for
example, people would report less income.
5
The basic supply-side question, therefore, is
whether higher tax rates are offset by a lower
tax base. Since tax revenues are the product of
these two factors, it is impossible to say, a pri-
ori, whether income tax revenues rise or fall in
response to an increase in tax rates.
Seigniorage Revenue and Money Growth
An increase in the money growth rate has
an effect on seigniorage that is analogous to the
effect that an increase in the tax rate has on
income tax revenue. To illustrate this point, I
modify the expression for seigniorage revenue
to identify a tax rate and tax base. The date t
quantity of money in circulation is equal to the
product of a growth rate and date t – 1 stock.
Thus,
(3) Mt = qtMt–1,
where  q is the gross rate of money supply
expansion. With q > 0, the percentage change 
in the money supply is q – 1. Use Equation 3 
to substitute for Mt–1 in Equation 1. The result-
ing government budget constraint is given by
(2¢) gt + rtbt–1 = ttyt + bt + vtMt (1 – 1/qt).
The analog to income tax revenue is now more
accessible. In Equation 2¢, the total revenue
from money creation is now the product of a
tax base, vtMt, and a tax rate, (1 – 1/q), that is
positively related to the rate of money growth.
To complete the analogy to the tax reve-
nue setting, linking the seigniorage tax base to
the seigniorage tax rate is necessary. One way
to do this is to assume that the real quantity of
money—which for seigniorage revenue is the
tax base—is a function of its real rate of return.
More specifically, let real money balances be
positively related to the real return on money. It
is straightforward to show that the real rate of
return on money is the inverse of the inflation
rate; that is, 1/p, where p = pt/pt –1.
6 Other things
being equal, the rate of inflation is positively
related to the rate of money growth. Hence,
faster money growth means that the real return
on money falls. It follows that faster money
growth results in a smaller tax base for real
seigniorage revenue.
Overall, faster money growth can lead to
either more or less real seigniorage revenue,
depending on whether the change in the tax
rate or the change in the tax base is quantita-
tively larger.
Reserve Requirements and the Tax Base
There is another monetary policy tool that
could potentially influence real seigniorage rev-
enue. The reserve requirement stipulates that
money balances cannot be less than g percent
of bank deposits, where g denotes the reserve
requirement ratio. Consequently, for a given
level of deposits, a higher reserve requirement
implies that the quantity of real money balances
increases; that is, a larger tax base. However,
holding the level of deposits constant is
unlikely. An increase in the reserve requirement
ratio may induce people to decrease their total
savings and hence their bank deposits. As a
result, people may avoid the inflation tax by
reducing their bank deposits.
To illustrate this point, people have two
means of saving: government bonds and money.
For simplicity, I assume that the real return on
the government bonds, r, is constant and that
these bonds dominate money in terms of offer-
ing a higher rate of return—that is, 1/p < r.
In this economy, banks serve a very sim-
ple function. I assume that government bonds
are issued in denominations that are too large
for any one saver to acquire. The bank cost-
lessly pools the funds to acquire these govern-
ment bonds. Because the bank maximizes
profits in a perfectly competitive market, the
rate of return on deposits will also be r. Each
person takes the rate of return on deposits as
given. The reserve requirement stipulates that
the person hold a fraction of these deposits as
money balances.
7 Because money is rate of
return dominated by government bonds, the
person will not hold any fiat money in excess of
this reserve requirement. The equilibrium return
on a person’s savings is
where q is the gross real return on savings. Note
that q is a weighted average of the rate of return
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bonds. With 1/p < r, Equation 4 implies that 
q < r. In other words, the reserve requirement
ratio drives a wedge between the return on
bonds and the return to savings.
Suppose there is an increase in the reserve
requirement ratio. The quantity of real money
balances held by people is gd, where d is the
quantity of goods deposited with banks. For a
given level of deposits, people will hold more
money and the tax base rises. Equation 4, how-
ever, implies that the real return on savings falls
as the reserve requirement ratio increases. It
seems reasonable to assume that people’s sav-
ings are positively related to the real return on
savings. Therefore, it follows that a higher
reserve requirement ratio will result in a decline
in a person’s savings. A decline in savings
implies a decline in the quantity of bank
deposits. As such, g is increasing and d is falling
so that the product—the seigniorage tax base—
could either increase or decrease.
The thrust of this section is twofold. First,
real seigniorage revenue is formally defined.
Second, economic theory offers an ambiguous
picture regarding the effects that monetary 
policy settings have on the size of this revenue.
The gist of the economic argument is that 
people try to avoid taxes, so with higher tax
rates, whether it be inflation or income, they
have an incentive to reduce the quantity of the
good being taxed. The remainder of this article
seeks to establish some preliminary observa-
tions on the correlation between a country’s
reliance on seigniorage revenue and its mone-
tary policy settings.
THE DATA
I obtain the data in this article from
International Financial Statistics. I use annual
observations, spanning the period 1965–94. For
each of the variables I examine over this 30-year
period, I use the sample mean to measure each
country’s central tendency. Unfortunately, obser-
vations are not available for each country for
each year. Each country in the sample has at
least fifteen annual observations. The result is a
sample of sixty-seven countries.
8
Following Fischer (1982), I compute the
ratio of seigniorage revenue to output, hereafter
S/Y, for each country.
9 Here, I use high-powered
money as the measure of the money stock (M ).
One alternative to computing ratios is to convert
each country’s seigniorage to a dollar-equivalent
value. The chief advantage to using ratios is that
no assumptions are required regarding the ex-
change rate and purchasing power parity.
Before reporting any statistics, it is impor-
tant to note that the reserve requirement ratio
presents a measurement issue. In principal, the
average marginal reserve requirement ratio—
the ratio that applies to the next dollar
deposited—would be measured.
10 In practice,
however, measuring this is not so simple. There
is a dizzying array of reserve requirements; U.S.
banks are currently required to hold reserves
equal to 3 percent of the first $49.3 million of
checkable deposits and 10 percent of all
deposits above the low-reserve tranche. There-
fore, it matters whether the deposits are going
into small banks or large banks. In other coun-
tries, the reserve requirement structures are
even more convoluted.
11
Equations 1 through 4 are built on the
notion that there is one reserve requirement
ratio that is the marginal reserve requirement.
To compute the marginal reserve requirement
ratio, one could use the distribution of deposits
across the different categories corresponding to
the reserve requirement structure. For example,
20 percent of the deposits are in small U.S.
banks (with less than $49.3 million in checkable
deposits) and 80 percent are in large banks. 
The average marginal reserve requirement 
ratio would be (0.2•0.03) + (0.8•0.1) = 0.086.
Unfortunately, neither the United States nor any
other countries report the distribution across
deposit categories, which is necessary to con-
struct such a measure. Consequently, I use the
reserve-to-deposit ratio, denoted R/D, (here-
after reserve ratio) as a proxy for the reserve
requirement ratio. Historically, reserve require-
ments have been applied against deposits
included in what is the U.S. counterpart to M2.
Accordingly, I use M2 less currency outside the
bank as my measure of bank deposits. As it is
measured, the reserve ratio ignores any extra
information contained in the distribution of
deposits across the alternative categories.
Instead, different deposit categories are treated
as if there is only one type.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the
seigniorage ratio, S/Y; as well as a monetary 
policy measure, g; a tax rate measure, TAX; and
the growth rate of output, y¢. On average,
seigniorage revenue accounts for a fairly small
fraction of total output—about 2 percent.
12 Tax
receipts are, on average, about 22 percent of
aggregate output. As one would probably
expect, seigniorage revenue is not the primary
source of government revenue.
Generally, the government budget con-
straint links the variables in Table 1 together. As
such, the statistics describe the central tenden-14
cies and average dispersion of monetary policy,
fiscal policy, and some aggregate measure of
economic activity. The money growth rate, g, is
(Mt/Mt–1) – 1. TAX is the ratio of tax revenue to
GNP. Lastly, y ¢ = (Yt/Yt –1) – 1 is the growth rate
of output.
One rather interesting finding is how the
reliance on seigniorage revenue is distributed.
Approximately three-fourths of the countries
collect, on average, less than 2 percent of GNP
through money creation. Most of the variation,
therefore, occurs among those countries in the
top quartile of the distribution. In this sample,
Ghana relies most heavily on seigniorage, col-
lecting revenues equal to 10 percent of output,
on average, through money creation. Overall,
the distribution of S/Y ratios is quite skewed
toward the low-seigniorage-reliance tail of the
distribution.
Table 1 also reports the range of reserve
ratios and average money growth rates. The dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum
values is substantial. Reserve ratios range from a
low of 0.6 percent to 64 percent. Money growth
rates range from 3.3 percent to nearly 90 per-
cent. This evidence shows that banks hold a
substantial fraction of money against deposits in
some countries. It also shows that some coun-
tries create money at a rapid pace.
Do countries that rely heavily on seignior-
age revenue also exhibit large year-to-year
volatility in their earnings from money creation?
The answer indicates whether countries tend to
rely on seigniorage revenue consistently or if
there are periods of heavy reliance on seignior-
age interspersed with periods in which coun-
tries rely less on it. A positive correlation
between the seigniorage ratio and volatility
would show that countries with large values of
S/Y, for example, also tend to experience
greater year-over-year variability in the S/Y ratio.
Conversely, if the correlation coefficient is neg-
ative, then countries that have relatively high
S/Y ratios tend to experience less variability in
the year-to-year reliance on seigniorage.
The correlation coefficient between a
country’s average reliance on seigniorage reve-
nue and its sample standard deviation is 0.8462.
Thus, the high correlation coefficient suggests
that countries with high seigniorage rates have
the greatest volatility in year-over-year realiza-
tions. In other words, countries that rely, on
average, more heavily on money creation as a
source of revenue also tend to exhibit the
largest variability in reliance from year to year.
In contrast, countries that rely relatively little on
seigniorage revenue tend to receive about the
same fraction of GNP from year to year.
13
Figure 1 focuses on the two monetary pol-
icy variables. Specifically, it plots combinations
of the average reserve ratio and the average
money growth rate for each country in this sam-
ple. The plot suggests that a country with a high
average reserve ratio has a high average money
growth rate. Formal statistics support the notion
that the reserve ratio and money growth are
positively related; the correlation coefficient
between the reserve ratio and the money
growth rate is 0.72.
Thus, three facts emerge from this prelim-
inary review of the data. These facts serve to
answer the primary question of how much
countries rely on seigniorage revenue. First, for
most countries, seigniorage revenue accounts
for less than 2 percent of output. Second, coun-
tries with the highest average reliance on
seigniorage revenue also tend to have the
greater year-to-year volatility in the S/Y ratio.
Third, the evidence suggests that monetary 




Variables mean deviation Minimum Maximum
S/Y .0211 .0201 .0025 .0998
R/D .1712 .1303 .0068 .6402
g .2085 .1667 .0332 .8981
TAX .2254 .1008 .0537 .5586
y¢ .0407 .0181 –.0018 .0904
S/Y Real seigniorage/real GDP
R/D Bank reserves/deposits (M2 less currency)
g Percentage change in high-powered money
TAX Tax revenue/GDP
y ¢ Percentage change in real GDP
Figure 1
Cross-Country Plots of Reserve Requirements
Versus Money Growth
Percentage change in high-powered money
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another; countries with high money growth
rates also tend to have high reserve ratios.
MONETARY POLICY AND SEIGNIORAGE
To determine whether a relationship exists
between a country’s monetary policy settings
and its reliance on seigniorage revenue, I pre-
sent results from a simple regression. Because
of this potentially nonlinear relationship, I use 
a sufficient statistic, z, to measure monetary 
policy settings. Specifically, let z = [R/D/(1 +
R/D)][g/(1 + g)]. The economics motivating this
decision is sketched out in the box entitled “A
Case for Combining the Money Growth Rate
with the Reserve Ratio.” Statistical issues also
arise, in part, because of the evidence presented
in Figure 1. Recall from Figure 1 (and the cor-
relation coefficient) that countries with high
average reserve ratios tend to have high average
money growth rates. By studying the contribu-
tion of each of the monetary policy measures,
multicollinearity is a potential problem; that is,
if two independent variables are highly corre-
lated, the standard errors of the coefficients are
inflated, creating inference problems. In meas-
uring monetary policy settings with a single
variable, I am assuming that z is a sufficient 
statistic for monetary policy. As a sufficient sta-
tistic, z is useful because changes in it capture
changes in each of the monetary policy vari-
ables being studied. As such, z is serving as a
measure of the overall thrust of monetary policy
as it relates to seigniorage revenue.
One additional property of z is note-
worthy. It is straightforward to show that the
definition of z implies a concave relationship
between it and each of the two monetary policy
variables. To illustrate this, consider the effect of
a change in the reserve ratio, holding the
money growth rate constant. As the reserve
ratio increases, z increases also, but the change
in  z will be smaller as the reserve ratio
increases. In other words, for a given increase
in the reserve ratio, z will increase at a dimin-
ishing rate. The same holds if, for example, the
money growth rate increases, holding the
reserve ratio constant. With a positive coeffi-
cient on z, the relationship between the
seigniorage rate and each of the monetary pol-
icy variables is concave.
14
In the benchmark regression, I include the
squared value of z and a constant term as addi-
tional explanatory variables. In doing so, it is
possible to assess whether there are any addi-
tional nonlinearities that characterize the rela-
tionship between a country’s monetary policy
settings and its reliance on seigniorage reve-
nue. If the additional quadratic term in the
regression is significant, this relationship will
vary as z varies. For instance, if the coefficient
on z
2 is significantly less than zero, the evi-
dence suggests that the relationship is concave.
Conversely, if the coefficient on the squared
term is significantly greater than zero, the evi-
dence indicates that the relationship is convex.
15
The results from the benchmark regres-
sion are reported in column 1 of Table 2.
16 The
coefficient on z is significantly greater than zero,
while the coefficient on z
2 is not significantly
different from zero. Thus, the evidence is con-
sistent with the notion that countries with high
monetary policy settings (high z values) tend to
rely more heavily on seigniorage revenue than
do countries with lower monetary policy set-
tings (low z values). As discussed above, the
evidence suggests a positive, concave relation-
ship between a country’s reserve ratio and
money growth rate and its reliance on seignior-
age revenue. Further, the adjusted R
2—a meas-
ure of the variation in seigniorage that is
accounted for by the regression variables—indi-
cates the monetary policy measure accounts for
more than 40 percent of the variation in the S/Y
ratio, which is a reasonably good fit for a cross-
country sample.
Table 2




Variable model sophistication I sophistication II
constant .011* .0094* .0113*
(.0032) (.0034) (.0032)
z .3982† .4273† .3835†
(.1788) (.1722) (.1808)
z
2 –.0915 –.1554 –.0072
(1.157) (1.1854) (1.1545)
y 65‡ .— –.338E-06 .—
(.416E-06)
OECD .— .— –.006§
(.0033)
OECD•z .— .— –1.144*
(.3909)
OECD•z
2 .— .— 165.817*
(37.035)
adjusted R
2 .448 .504 .437
Standard error .0148 .0135 .0149
of the estimate
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
† Significant at the 5 percent level.
‡ Per capita real GDP in 1965.
§ Significant at the 10 percent level.16
A Case for Combining the Money Growth Rate with the Reserve Ratio
In this box, I show that the S/Y ratio, in equilib-
rium, is a nonlinear function of the reserve require-
ment and money growth rate.This application is a
modified version of the economy developed in
Champ and Freeman (1994).The chief feature of
the model is that a person engages in market activ-
ity for two consecutive periods. In other words, N
people enter market activity at each date t, stay for
two periods, and then exit. It is equivalent to inter-
pret this setup as one in which people are alive for
two periods. In this context for a particular date t,
those entering the market for the first time are “the
young,” and those entering the second period of
market activity are “the old.” Each person receives
labor income when young, but nothing when old.
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, and
so on. I assume there are N people at date t = 1 who
have only one period in the economy; members of
this generation are the “initial old.” Preferences are
identical for all people born at date t and after.
For simplicity, I focus exclusively on a station-
ary version of the following economy. All people
born at date t = 1 and later have identical prefer-
ences.Thus, without loss of generality, one can
focus on the problem of the representative person,
which is characterized by the following equations:
(B.1) maxc1,c2 ln(c1t) + bln(c2t +1)
(B.2) y ‡ c1t + at
(B.3) c2t +1 £ qt +1at
(B.4) at = vtmt + dt
(B.5) vtmt ‡g dt,
where c1t is the young person’s consumption at
date t; c2t+1 is old-age consumption by the person
born at date t; b is the person’s discount factor; y is
the person’s labor income; a is the total quantity of
goods saved by the young person; q is the gross
return on savings carried from date t to date t + 1;
and d is the quantity of goods stored as bank
deposits by the young person. A person can also
choose fiat money, which is m. Here, v stands for
the value of fiat money—that is, the quantity of the
consumption good that can be purchased with one
unit of money.The consumption good is perishable.
Equation B.1 is a function that describes the
welfare a representative person receives during a
market-active period.The person seeks to maximize
welfare by consuming as much of the consumption
good as possible. Equation B.2 represents the two
options—to save or to consume—that the typical
young person faces when young, while Equation
B.3 indicates that the typical old person can con-
sume up to the value of principal and interest
earned on savings. Equation B.4 shows that savings
are in the form of either real money balances or
bank deposits. Lastly, Equation B.5 is the reserve
requirement, dictating that real money balances
cannot be less than g percent of bank deposits.
I assume that deposits offer a greater return
than fiat money. Consequently, the typical person
will hold the minimum quantity of fiat money bal-
ances. Equations B.4 and B.5, therefore, imply that 
at = (1 + g)dt. Substitute for a in Equations B.2 and
B.3, and solve Equation B.3 for (1 + g)dt, substitut-
ing the result into Equation B.2. After the algebra,
the expression is
(B.6) y ‡ c1t + c2t +1/qt +1,
which is the person’s lifetime budget.
To maximize lifetime utility, the typical person
will choose first- and second-period consumption
so that
Equation B.7 is an efficiency condition. It says that
labor income will be allocated between first- and
second-period consumption so that the benefits
received from the last good consumed when young
(measured by 1/c1t ) are equal to the benefits
received from the last good consumed when old
(measured by bq/c2t +1). In this economy, the opti-
mizing conditions imply that the typical person will
spend all of the labor income. Hence, Equation B.6
holds with equality.
In a stationary equilibrium, c1t = c1t +1 and
c2t +1 = c 2t +2 at any date t, so that one can drop
the time subscripts. For a stationary equilibrium,
Equations B.6 and B.7 imply that c1 = y/(1 + b).
With 0 < b < 1, the typical person will spend a fixed
fraction of labor income on consumption when
young.
One might ask why the equilibrium expression
for c1 does not contain q.The answer is that a
change in the gross return on assets has two
opposing effects on consumption when young: sub-
stitution and wealth.With the substitution effect, an
increase in q, for example, makes consumption
when young more expensive relative to consump-
tion when old. (Note that in the lifetime budget con-
straint [Equation B.6], 1/q can be interpreted as the
price of consumption when old.) Thus, an increase
in the gross return to assets would induce people
to consume less when young and more when old.
With the wealth effect, when c2 becomes less
expensive, consuming more of both c1 and c2 is
possible. As such, an increase in q, for instance,
will induce people to consume more when young.
Clearly, the substitution and wealth effects have
opposing impacts on consumption when young.
With log utility, these effects exactly offset each
other. Consequently, in a stationary equilibrium the
value of c1 is independent of movements in the








bFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       17 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1998
Important differences across countries
could alter the relationship between monetary
policy and the reliance on seigniorage revenue.
For example, with only z as an explanatory
variable, the regression’s constant term captures
any differences between countries. Insofar as
differences across countries can be measured,
additional insight may be gained into the rela-
tionship between monetary policy and reliance
on seigniorage. Such measurements indicate
whether the results obtained in this analysis are
robust.
A particular concern is the ability of 
people to avoid the inflation tax. Such avoid-
ance depends, in part, on a country’s financial
sophistication. Citizens in countries with more
sophisticated financial structure, for instance,
can avoid taxation by shifting to nonreservable
deposits. They can also dodge the tax by shift-
ing from currency to, say, credit cards as the
means of payment. It would seem prudent,
therefore, to measure a country’s financial
sophistication to assess whether this omitted
variable affects the relationship between a
country’s monetary policy settings and its
reliance on seigniorage.
The measure of financial sophistication
should not depend on the monetary policy set-
A Case for Combining the Money Growth Rate with the Reserve Ratio
(continued)
With c1 = y/(1 + b), the level of bank deposits
can be represented as
Next, substituting Equation B.8 into Equation B.5
yields the expression for the equilibrium value of
real money balances; formally,
Here one can see the importance of the equilib-
rium expression for consumption when young.
Because of the substitution and wealth effects, 
neither the quantity of deposits nor the quantity 
of real money balances is affected by changes in
the gross return on assets.The implication is that
the tax base for real seigniorage revenue is not
affected by changes in real return on assets.
Expressing the equilibrium value of real
seigniorage revenue is now possible. Substituting
Equation B.9 into the expression for real seignior-
age revenue yields vtmt (1 – 1/q). With g = q – 1, 
I divide the expression by y so that the equilib-
rium reliance on seigniorage revenue per young
person is
Equation B.10 indicates that the equilibrium s/y
ratio is a nonlinear function of the reserve ratio and
the money growth rate.
1 Indeed, it is straightforward
to show that the equilibrium value of s/y is a con-
cave function of both the reserve requirement ratio
and the money growth rate (see note 12).
To see how a change in monetary policy
affects the equilibrium seigniorage ratio, consider a
permanent, unanticipated increase in the reserve
requirement ratio. In this model economy, Equation
B.5 indicates that the holdings of real money bal-
ances will increase. Remember that the equilibrium








































level of deposits is not affected even though q will
decline.Thus, the model economy predicts that the
equilibrium seigniorage ratio will rise in response to
an increase in the reserve requirement.
Next, consider a permanent, unanticipated
increase in the money growth rate. With faster
money growth, Equation B.10 indicates that an
economy’s reliance on real seigniorage revenue
will increase. With an increase in g, the tax rate on
real seigniorage revenue will rise and the gross
return on assets will decline. Because of the utility
function, the equilibrium quantity of real money bal-
ances is not affected by the decline in the gross
real return on assets.Thus, faster money growth
translates into an increase in the seigniorage ratio.
For this model economy, the s/y ratio
increases with respect to an increase in either the
reserve requirement ratio or money growth rate,
but at a declining rate. For different utility specifica-
tions, substitution and wealth effects would not
necessarily cancel each other out. Hence, the typi-
cal person could respond to an increase in q by
increasing consumption when young, thereby sav-
ing less. Accordingly, a young person could reduce
holdings of real money balances by enough to see
a decline in the s/y ratio for a given increase in
either the reserve requirement or the money growth
rate.The purpose of this box is to illustrate the
basic economic trade-offs. Hence, arguing the
appropriate utility specification is outside the scope
of this article.
Overall, Equation B.10 suggests a particular
sufficient statistic for assessing the relationship
between monetary policy and a country’s reliance
on seigniorage revenue.Throughout the statistical
analysis, I use the product z = [g/(1 + g)][g/(1 + g)]
as the measure of monetary policy.
Note
1 Here, the s/y ratio pertains to the ratio of per capita 
levels, which accounts for the use of lowercase letters.18
tings to get an accurate estimate of the coeffi-
cient between monetary policy and seigniorage
reliance. In other words, movements in the
measure should not reflect behaviors related to
monetary policy settings, and yet the variable
should be reasonably well correlated with a
country’s level of financial sophistication. In
reality, finding such a measure is quite difficult.
Two variables are offered as proxies for finan-
cial sophistication: the level of real per capita
GDP in 1965 and a dummy variable indicating
whether the country is a member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
17 Certainly OECD mem-
bership and monetary policy settings are con-
ceivably linked as part of a country’s policy
package. The more modest claim is that OECD
membership and per capita real GDP are less
likely to respond to movements in the monetary
policy settings than are financial-sophistication
measures such as bank deposits.
Figure 2 plots the combination of z and
S/Y as well as separate fitted lines for non-OECD
and OECD countries. Each line is fitted to a
regression of the form (S/Y)I = c0 + azi + bzi
2.
These two fitted lines appear quite different.
Based on this preliminary look at the data, the
evidence suggests that the relationship between
a country’s monetary policy statistic and its
reliance on seigniorage revenue is different for
developed countries than it is for less developed
countries. Indeed, the fitted line for the non-
OECD countries is upward sloping, whereas the
one for the OECD countries appears to have
some curvature.
I report regression results in columns 2
and 3 of Table 2. Here, I use two proxies to
measure financial sophistication; one is the
OECD membership, and the other is per capita
real income in 1965. Two different sets of
results emerge. Specifically, with per capita real
income as the measure of financial sophis-
tication, the evidence suggests a linear relation-
ship between seigniorage reliance and z. As
such, the evidence suggests, as it did when 
no financial sophistication measures were in-
cluded, that countries that rely the most heavily
on seigniorage revenue have higher monetary
policy settings.
Consider, however, the results for a case in
which OECD membership is used as a proxy for
financial sophistication. These regression results
correspond to the evidence presented in Figure
2. The formal statistical analysis supports the
eyeball difference presented in the figure; that
is, the z–S/Y relationship is significantly differ-
ent for OECD countries than for non-OECD
countries. The coefficient on OECD • z is nega-
tive and significant, and the coefficient on
OECD  • z
2 is positive and significant. Thus, the
evidence suggests that the relationship between
seigniorage rates and monetary policy settings is
convex. Indeed, the evidence indicates that an
OECD country reaches a minimum reliance on
seigniorage revenue at a value of z = 0.0023.
To illustrate this result, suppose one is
looking at two OECD countries—country A and
country B. Each has a different monetary policy
setting, with country A always associated with
the lower value of z. According to the regres-
sion statistics, if z < 0.0023 for both countries,
then country B would rely less on seigniorage
revenue than would country A. In contrast, for
z > 0.0023, the regression predicts that country
B would rely more on seigniorage revenue than
would country A.
18
The convex relationship exhibited by
OECD countries is puzzling. In the model econ-
omy described in the box, financial sophistica-
tion would seem to permit a country’s citizens
to avoid the inflation tax. Given an increase in
z, the equilibrium outcome for the S/Y ratio
would either decline or increase, but at a
decreasing rate as people avoid the inflation
tax. In other words, it is reasonable to expect
that increased tax-avoidance capabilities would
result in a more concave relationship between 
a country’s monetary policy settings and its
reliance on seigniorage revenue, not a more
convex one.
Overall, the evidence suggests that there is
a systematic, positive relationship between a
Figure 2
Seigniorage–Income Ratio and 
Monetary Policy Settings
Seigniorage ratio, S/Y
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country’s monetary policy settings and its re-
liance on seigniorage revenue. Thus, countries
with higher monetary policy settings tend to
rely more heavily on seigniorage. But compared
with less financially sophisticated countries, the
more financially sophisticated countries tend to
rely on seigniorage revenue at an increasing
rate. The findings with respect to financial
sophistication are difficult to explain and de-
serve more attention.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I present evidence in this article on the
importance of seigniorage revenue and its rela-
tionship to monetary policy. I use cross-country
observations to examine whether the average
money growth rate and average reserve ratio
are systematically related to a country’s reliance
on seigniorage revenue. Both economic and sta-
tistical considerations suggest that some combi-
nation of the money growth rate and the reserve
ratio should be used in the empirical analysis.
Consequently, a country’s monetary policy set-
ting is measured using a combination variable
as opposed to investigating two separate rela-
tionships—one between seigniorage reliance
and the reserve ratio and the other between
seigniorage reliance and the money growth rate.
The main finding in this article is that there
is a systematic, positive relationship between a
country’s monetary policy settings and its re-
liance on seigniorage revenue. Thus, countries
that rely most heavily on seigniorage revenue
tend to have the highest values of the monetary
policy measure. There is some additional evi-
dence that the relationship between the mone-
tary policy variable and the seigniorage rate is
nonlinear for OECD countries. Here, OECD
membership is used as a proxy for financial
sophistication. The evidence suggests that OECD
countries rely on seigniorage revenue at an
increasing rate for given changes in the mone-
tary policy variable.
The findings in this article constitute a
very preliminary investigation of the relation-
ship between seigniorage revenue and mone-
tary policy. There is always a risk of excluding
a key variable in a regression, and that risk 
certainly holds here. One approach would be 
to control for a host of other environmental 
factors—for example, a more complete analysis
of the depth and structure of financial markets.
The most surprising and, in some ways,
the most interesting results are those differenti-
ating between financially developed and less
financially developed countries. If these results
were to stand up to further scrutiny, economic
theory would need to address the puzzle. One
possible line of research would be to consider a
simple open economy in which two countries
differ in terms of financial sophistication and
monetary policy rules.
Another avenue for future research would
be to recognize that monetary policy variables
and seigniorage revenue are jointly determined.
While I have tried to describe the correlations
without referring to any monetary policy as
“causing” movements in seigniorage revenue,
the estimated regressions could be interpreted
as treating monetary policy as exogenous to the
determination of such revenue. Edwards and
Tabellini (1991) examine seigniorage revenue as
the outcome of various political forces that
influence, among other things, monetary policy
settings. Thus, future research could attempt 
to disentangle the relative importance of politi-
cal factors, controlling for monetary policy
explicitly.
NOTES
1 See Cox (1992) for an excellent discussion of the
practical relationship between the Federal Reserve
and the U.S. Treasury. For an interesting description of
seigniorage in medieval times, see Rolnick, Velde, and
Weber (1994).
2 For reference, the United States raises, on average,
about 2 percent of federal government expenditures
through money creation.
3 After all the accounting is consolidated for the govern-
ment and the central bank, the net change in the gov-
ernment’s income state is that money creation amounts
to a revenue source to cover various expenses.
4 Bryant and Wallace (1984) offer an explanation for the
coexistence of government bonds and money. They
argue that the two types of government paper effec-
tively price discriminate between “rich” and “poor”
households.
As far as my assumption about one-period bonds
is concerned, I could examine a more complicated
maturity structure for government debt. Such general-
ity would not alter the conclusions that I reach about
seigniorage revenue, but it would mean that I would
have to keep tabs on the entire distribution of govern-
ment bonds and when each one matures.
5 The reduction in reported income can come either
from effective avoidance or from people working less
or acquiring less capital. Of course, the discussion
describes what happens to the steady-state level of
income.
6 There is no explicit interest on money. Consequently,
its one-period rate of return is calculated as the ratio 
of the date t price (the potential selling price) to the20
date t – 1 price (the purchase price). Formally, this is
the ratio of vt/vt–1. With vt = 1/pt, then simple substitu-
tion yields the expression for the gross real return on
money.
7 Here, the reserve requirement pins down the fraction
of a person’s portfolio held in the form of money bal-
ances. This approach is qualitatively the same as one
in which the reserve requirement pins down the bank’s
portfolio.
8 The data set is available from the author upon request.
9 Fischer is primarily interested in describing why coun-
tries maintain national currencies. Computing the
seigniorage-to-GNP ratio demonstrates how important
seigniorage is. The ratio represents the command over
resources that a government obtains by creating money.
10 The income tax analog is the average marginal tax
rate. See, for example, Seater (1985).
11 Historically, the U.S. reserve requirement structure was
more convoluted. In the past, for example, it mattered
whether the commercial bank was located in a
Reserve Bank city or outside.
12 Interestingly, Fischer (1982) presents evidence that
several governments have made substantial use of
seigniorage. In Fischer’s sample, which generally 
covers the period between 1960 and 1978, Argentina
collected, on average, 6.2 percent of GNP through
money creation.
13 This result does not bear directly on the relative impor-
tance of seigniorage revenue. Rather, it bears on the
issue of variability within a country across time. In
short, the reader gains a sense of how the countries in
the sample rely on seigniorage over time.
14 The effect of a change in the reserve ratio, holding
money growth constant, is given by the following de-
rivative: ¶z/¶(R/D) = W/(1 + R/D)
2, where W = g/(1 + g).
With W > 0, the expression says z is increasing the
reserve ratio. In addition, ¶
2z/¶(R/D)
2 =(–2 •W)/(1+ R/D)
3,
which is negative for W > 0.
15 To see this relationship, suppose the estimated regres-
sion is given by
S/Y = c0 + az + bz
2.
For a country with a 1-percentage-point higher aver-
age z, an estimate of the change in S/Y is a + 2bz.
Thus, a 1-percentage-point change in z depends on
the value of z.
16 In all regressions, the Newey–West procedure is
applied to correct any potential bias in standard
errors. In this particular application, heteroskedasticity
is the chief worry.
17 Per capita real GDP comes from the Summers–Heston
Penn World Tables. In addition, regressions are run
using per capita real GDP for 1980 and 1994 as alter-
native measures of financial sophistication in case the
1965 GDP value suffers from some time-specific fac-
tors. The regressions are qualitatively the same as
those reported in Table 2.
18 Three OECD countries in this sample—France, the
Netherlands, and Norway—have z values less than
0.0023. Using the method outlined in Fomby, Hill, and
Johnson (1984, 58), one can compute the standard
errors for the value of z at which seigniorage reliance
is minimized. With 90 percent confidence, the seignior-
age-reliance minimizing value of z is between 0.0022
and 0.0024.
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